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A posteriori necessity is a concept in metaphysics and the philosophy of language. This prospect says that some knowledge gained a posteriori can also be necessarily true. It challenges previously widespread belief that only a priori knowledge can be necessary. It draws on a number of philosophical concepts such as necessity, the causal theory of reference, rigidity, and the a prior a posteriori distinction. It was first introduced by philosopher Saul Kripke in his 1970 series of lectures at Princeton University. The transcript of these lectures was then complied and assembled into his seminal book, ''Naming and Necessity''. == Causal theory of reference == Kripke’s causal theory of reference is a necessary component of a posteriori necessity. The causal theory of reference is an explanation of how terms acquire specific referents. Referring terms that it may include are proper names, natural kinds, and logical terms. A causal theory of reference claims that the referent of a name is fixed by the original act of naming. Future uses of the name continue to successfully refer to the referent via a causal chain. The chain can then, in principle, be traced back to the original act of naming. Kripke indicates that this explanation is more appealing than the descriptive theory of names developed by Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege . The descriptive theory says that names are attached to a uniquely identifying description of that thing. A name’s semantic contents are identical to the descriptions associated with them. Consider these two theories’ approach to the following question: To whom does the name “Richard Nixon” refer? The causal/ historical theory could proceed thusly: Suppose the parents of a newborn baby boy gesture to their child and declare “We shall name him Richard Nixon!” From that time onward, that person is referred to as “Richard Nixon”. When someone uses the name “Richard Nixon”, that act can be traced back to the initial baptism of the child by his parents. The name refers to the object originally designated as “Richard Nixon”. According to the descriptivist theory of names, the referent might be fixed like so: the name “Richard Nixon” refers to the man who won the 1968 election, the 37th President of the United States, etc. Only one person satisfies this description and that is “Richard Nixon”. This could be true for a number of different unique descriptions that identify “Richard Nixon”. So the name “Richard Nixon” would refer to whoever satisfies the particular unique description. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「A Posteriori Necessity」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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